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Positive and Negative Information Transfers from Management Forecasts 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 We examine positive and negative information transfers associated with 
management earnings and revenue forecasts. Positive information transfers are due to 
industry commonalities whereas negative information transfers are caused by 
competitive shifts. We argue that positive and negative intra-industry information 
transfers offset each other and lead to an overall finding of no information transfers 
even though they exist. We also conjecture that the type of information transfers from 
the same management forecast can be positive or negative based on the characteristics 
of the information receiver. We hypothesize positive information transfers to non-rival 
firms and negative information transfers to rivals. Consistent with our prediction, we 
find negative (positive) information transfers between forecasting firms and non-
forecasting rival (non-rival) firms in the same industry. Through analyses using 
competitors identified by Hoover’s and 10-K reports, we show more general evidence 
of negative information transfers to rival firms.   
 
Keywords:  Information transfer, management earnings forecast, management revenue 
forecast, rival              
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Positive and Negative Information Transfers from Management Forecasts 
 
 1. Introduction  
 This study provides evidence of negative information transfers from management forecasts 
to rival firms. Prior literature on information transfers from management forecasts (Baginski, 1987; 
Han, Wild, and Ramesh, 1989; Pyo and Lustgarten, 1990) focuses on positive intra-industry 
information transfers, where good (bad) news from a forecasting firm causes on-average a positive 
(negative) stock market reaction from non-forecasting firms in the same industry. We argue that 
the information transfer from the same management forecast can be positive or negative based on 
the degree of competitiveness between the forecaster and the information receiver. Positive 
information transfers are due to industry commonalities whereas negative information transfers are 
caused by competitive shifts between rival firms. Hence, we hypothesize negative information 
transfers to rivals, and positive information transfers to non-rival firms in the same industry.  A 
negative information transfer occurs when a good (bad) news announcement made by a firm 
conveys market share taken away from (given to) the competition, thereby causing a negative 
(positive) stock market reaction from rival firms. 
  Although prior studies (Foster, 1981; Baginski, 1987; Pownall and Waymire, 1989; 
Dietrich, 1989; Schipper, 1990) recognize the potential existence of information transfers from 
competitive shifts, little research has empirically examined negative information transfers. Two 
notable exceptions can be found in the finance literature. Lang and Stulz (1992) investigate 
contagion and competitive intra-industry effects with respect to bankruptcy announcements, and 
Laux, Starks, and Yoon (1998) examine the relative importance of these two different intra-
industry effects in relation to large dividend revisions. 
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 This study is different from previous research (e.g., Lang and Stulz, 1992; Laux, Starks, 
and Yoon, 1998) in several ways. First, unlike earlier studies that do not separate rival firms from 
other firms, we classify the information receivers as rival firms and non-rival firms. From this 
partitioning, we are able to show both positive and negative information transfers from the same 
set of management forecasts, which would not have been revealed without sample partitioning. 
Second, we examine not only negative “intra-industry” information transfers, but also the more 
general case of negative information transfers to all rival firms that are identified through searching 
Hoover’s or a forecasting firm’s 10-K report.  Finally, by documenting negative information 
transfers from management forecasts to rival firms in the same industry, we attempt to reconcile 
statistically insignificant (or marginally significant at best) evidence of intra-industry information 
transfers from directional tests and statistically significant results from non-directional tests 
documented in earlier literature.1  Our study attempts to distinguish between positive (due to 
industry commonalities) and negative (due to the competitive shifts) information transfers 
associated with management forecasts, and thus shed light on the issue of intra-industry 
information transfers. 
  In this study, we define firms that are listed as rivals in Hoover’s or in the forecasting 
firm’s 10-K report as rivals of the forecaster.  Firms classified as non-rivals of the forecaster are 
firms that share the same four-digit primary SIC code as the forecaster but are not listed as rivals 
in Hoover’s or the forecaster’s 10-K report.  
 The majority of our results support the existence of negative information transfers to rival 
firms. The results from industry information transfer analyses show negative (positive) intra-
                                                          
1 Foster (1981) and others use non-directional tests to increase the power of their empirical tests since directional 
tests may conclude no information transfers even though they exist. Prior research (e.g., Han, Wild, and Ramesh, 
1989) fails to find meaningful results for information transfers from directional tests while finding statistically 
significant results from non-directional tests. 
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industry information transfers between forecasting firms and non-forecasting firms identified as 
rivals (non-rivals) with the same four-digit primary SIC code.  Furthermore, negative intra-
industry information transfers from revenue forecasts are more evident than those from earnings 
forecasts.  We also present evidence on the more general case of negative information transfers. 
When we examine information transfers to all rivals identified in Hoover’s or 10-K reports, 
regardless of industry classification, negative information transfers are evident from management 
revenue forecasts and this result is mainly due to strong negative information transfers from bad 
news forecasts. Analyses of rival firms that are identified in Hoover’s or 10-K reports and share 
the same two-digit primary SIC codes with forecasting firms generate similar results.    
     The next section formulates our hypothesis. This is followed by a discussion of the 
research design. Section 4 discusses the empirical results.  The final section concludes. 
           
2. Hypothesis Development  
 Since Firth (1976) and Foster (1981) found co-movement between stock returns of firms 
releasing earnings and stock returns of other firms in the same industry, researchers have turned 
their attention to intra-industry information transfers from management forecasts due to 
externalities created by voluntary disclosures.  Pownall and Waymire (1989) show that firms 
issuing management earnings forecasts receive a lower magnitude of earnings information 
transfer at the time of other industry members’ earnings announcements than do firms that do not 
issue management earnings forecasts.  Baginski (1987) shows a positive relation between 
earnings forecast information and market-adjusted abnormal returns of non-forecasting firms. 
Han, Wild, and Ramesh (1989) attempt to separate announcement-induced information transfers 
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from general index movements. When returns are adjusted for industry index movements as well 
as market movements, they find that intra-industry information transfer is very weak at best.  
 If one group of non-forecasting firms receives positive information transfers and another 
group of non-forecasting firms receives negative information transfers from the same set of 
management forecasts, the overall result may be interpreted as indicating no information transfer 
due to the offsetting effects of the two types of information transfers.  In a study closely related 
to our research, Lang and Lundholm (1996) show that after controlling for a firm’s own 
earnings, the relation between its stock returns and industry counterpart firms’ earnings is 
negative. They interpret the result as meaning that other firms’ earnings announcements provide 
primarily a competitive component of information.  The empirical setting of Lang and Lundholm 
(1996) is different from the event study design used in other information transfer studies.  Lang 
and Lundholm (1996) focus on whether earnings of other firms in the same industry have 
incremental information content once a firm discloses its own earnings. In this setting, though 
other firms’ earnings announcements transfer industry information in general, they may not be 
reflected in a firm’s own returns because the firm’s own earnings are already disclosed.  Also, it 
is difficult to reconcile their findings of overall competitive information provided by other firms’ 
earnings with the overall positive information transfers appearing in intra-industry information 
transfer studies. 
 Determining whether positive or negative information transfer dominates likely depends 
on the competitive relationship between the forecasting firm and the firm that is the recipient of 
the forecast information. If a firm forecasts good (bad) news, this may convey good (bad) 
prospects for its industry, thereby leading to a positive information transfer. However, it could 
also mean market share taken away from (given to) rivals, leading to a negative information 
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transfer. Thus, if a firm makes a forecast, a positive information transfer caused by industry 
commonalities is likely to prevail with respect to industry counterpart firms that are not the 
forecasting firm’s rivals. In contrast, a negative information transfer due to a competitive shift 
may prevail for firms that are the forecasting firm’s rivals. Therefore, we propose and test the 
following hypothesis, stated in the alternative form: 
 
 The information transfer from a firm’s management forecast to rival (non-rival) firms is 
negative (positive).      
      
  
3. Research Design 
3.1. FORECASTER SAMPLE SELECTION 
 The sample of management earnings and revenue forecasts is from Wall Street Journal 
articles for the years 1987 to 1993 and is collected from the Dow Jones News Retrieval Service 
through use of a key word search.2  Both annual and interim forecasts are included. A 
management forecast must be attributed to a company official. In addition, the forecast must 
have been made on or before the last day of the fiscal period to which the forecast applies. 
Management forecasts made after the end of the fiscal period are often in effect preliminary 
announcements of earnings or revenue. In addition, a management forecast must be for the entire 
firm. Furthermore, management earnings forecasts containing only non-operating or 
extraordinary gain or loss components are not included in the sample. Also, the firms to which 
                                                          
2 The phrases used include two sets of keywords: (1) see(s), expect(s), forecast(s), project(s), estimate(s), higher, and 
lower; and (2) net, earnings, income, results, loss, gain, profit(s), improvement, better, performance, revenue(s), and 
sales.  All keywords, except revenue(s) and sales, were used in Bamber and Cheon (1998). 
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the forecasts belong must be on the Compustat database. The aforementioned requirements lead 
to an initial sample of 1,188 forecasts issued by 890 firms over 1987 to 1993. 
 Additional restrictions are applied. The management forecast must be in a quantitative  
(point, range, minimum, or maximum) format3 to permit comparison with analyst forecasts, and 
the firm must have the necessary daily stock returns available on the CRSP daily returns file. 
Those two additional criteria reduce the sample to 522 forecasts.  Finally, a forecasting firm must 
have the necessary analyst forecast information available from the Value Line Estimates & 
Projections File. This final requirement reduces the sample to 256 management forecasts: 152 
forecasts of earnings alone and 104 forecasts of earnings and revenue simultaneously. 
    
3.2. IDENTIFICATION OF NON-FORECASTING RIVAL AND NON-RIVAL FIRMS 
 For the purpose of testing industry commonalities versus competitive shifts, we partition 
non-forecasting firms as rivals with the forecaster and as non-rivals.  Rivals are defined to be all 
non-forecasting firms that are listed as rivals of the forecasting firm in either Hoover’s or the 
forecasting firm’s 10-K report.   However, when a company operates in several business areas, 
rivals identified by Hoover’s or 10-K reports can have different four-digit primary SIC industry 
classifications. For example, in Hoover’s, one of the top rivals of Intel is IBM, which has a 
different four-digit primary SIC code in Compustat.  We identify all rivals regardless of their 
four-digit industry membership and run the tests with (a) the full sample of rivals regardless of 
SIC code, (b) rivals that share the same two-digit SIC code with forecasting firms, and (c) rivals 
that share the same four-digit SIC code. Tests with rival firms that share the same four-digit 
                                                          
3 An example of a point forecast is ‘earnings are expected to be $2.00 per share for this period (or an upcoming 
period)’ whereas an example of a range forecast is ‘revenue is expected to be between $500 million and $550 
million.'  An example of a maximum (minimum) forecast is ‘earnings are expected to be no more than $3.00 per 
share’ (‘earnings are expected to be at least $1.50 per share’). 
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primary SIC code provide insights on intra-industry information transfers, and tests with the full 
sample of rivals regardless of their industry membership provide more general evidence on 
negative information transfers to rival firms. 
We hand-collect the forecasting firms’ rivals from Hoover’s or 10-Ks.  Hoover’s offers a 
wide range of company information, including a list of rivals. We search the following Hoover’s 
handbooks to find the forecasting firm and its rivals: Hoover’s Handbook of American Business 
1996, Hoover’s Handbook of Emerging Companies 1996, and Hoover’s Handbook of World 
Business 1995/96.  The Hoover’s handbooks began publication in 1991.  The rivals listed in the 
earliest issues of Hoover’s were drawn only from the set of firms included in the Hoover’s 
handbooks.  Thus, we collect rivals from the earliest obtainable issues of Hoover’s that contain a 
firm’s rivals drawn from the universe of firms.  Rivals for issuers of 127 management forecasts 
are identified through searching Hoover’s.  For the remaining forecasting firms, which are not in 
any of the Hoover’s handbooks we searched, we examine their 10-K reports filed for the period 
from 1994 through 1998.  For this task, we search the Securities and Exchange Commission’s 
(SEC’s) EDGAR database. We take rivals listed in the earliest 10-K report (between 1994 and 
1998) we can obtain for the firm.  Through the 10-K search, we identify rivals for issuers of 33 
additional management forecasts.  Together, we have rivals for 160 management forecasts.  After 
eliminating firms with daily stock returns not available on the CRSP daily returns file or with 
extreme abnormal returns4, we have 1,926 rivals for 154 management forecasts: 1,182 
observations that are matched with 92 forecasts of earnings alone and 744 observations that are 
matched with 62 forecasts of earnings and revenue.  
 Firms classified as non-rivals of the forecaster are non-forecasters that share the same four- 
                                                          
4 We eliminate firms that have abnormal returns of more than 100% or less than -100% on the day of the 
management forecast. 
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digit primary SIC code as the forecaster but are not listed as rivals in Hoover’s or the 10-K report.5   
Non-rival firms must have the necessary information from the CRSP daily returns file and the 
Compustat database.  The final sample of non-rivals with the same four-digit SIC code includes 
4,540 observations: 2,994 observations that are matched with forecasts of earnings alone and 
1,546 observations that are matched with forecasts of earnings and revenue.6  
In addition, we partition the sample by forecast news based on abnormal stock returns of 
forecasting firms around the time of the forecast; with positive abnormal returns implying good 
news and negative abnormal returns implying bad news. Since management earnings and 
revenue forecast surprises are often of different signs,7 the abnormal return is a better surrogate 
for the news of the forecasts in this study than are earnings or revenue surprises.  
 
3.3. SINGLE-INDEX AND TWO-INDEX PRICING MODELS 
  In determining abnormal returns, following Han, Wild, and Ramesh (1989), we employ 
both single-index and two-index pricing models as follows:        
 )Rβ  (α - R  u tM,
M
iiti,ti, ⋅+=  (1) 
 )RβRβ  (α - R  e tI,
I
itM,
M
iiti,ti, ⋅+⋅+=  (2)  
                                                          
5 We identified rivals for 154 management forecasts through the search of Hoover’s or the 10-K. For the remaining 
102 management forecasts, no rival is identified and all non-forecasting firms in the same four-digit SIC code 
industry are defined as non-rivals.  
6 Of 1,926 rival observations, 501 (893) rivals share the same four- (two-) digit SIC code with the forecasting firms. 
Since there are 4,540 non-rival observations, the total number of non-forecasting observations used in the analyses is 
5,041 (5,433) for four- (two-) digit SIC matching and 6,466 without industry matching. Of 744 rival observations 
matched with firms issuing both earnings and revenue forecasts, 186 (338) rivals share the same four- (two-) digit 
SIC code with the forecasting firms. Since there are 1,546 non-forecasting, non-rival observations, the total number 
of non-forecasting observations used in the analyses is 1,732 (1,884) for four- (two-) digit SIC matching and 2,290 
without industry matching. 
7 A total of 27 out of 104 joint management forecasts of earnings and revenue have earnings and revenue forecast 
surprises of different signs. 
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where Ri,t is the daily stock return for firm i on day t, RM,t is the return on a value-weighted 
market portfolio for day t, and RI,t is the return on an equally-weighted four-digit SIC code 
industry portfolio (not including firm i) for day t. Day t = 0 is the day of the management 
forecast and the parameters in equations (1) and (2) are estimated using ordinary least squares 
regressions with stock returns from days -220 to -21 relative to the date of the management 
forecast. Equation (1) is the abnormal return from the standard market model. Equation (2) is the 
abnormal return after controlling for both market and industry returns. Han, Wild, and Ramesh 
(1989) show that controlling for the industry cross-sectional covariation in returns is important in 
tests of intra-industry information transfer from management earnings forecasts.8  
 
3.4.  UNEXPECTED FORECASTS AND CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURNS 
 We measure earnings and revenue forecast surprises using the unexpected management 
forecast for firm i: 
 ( ) ti,ti,ti,ti, AEFAEF - MEF  UMEF =  (3) 
 ( ) ti,ti,ti,ti, ARFARF - MRF  UMRF =  (4) 
where UMEFi,t (UMRFi,t) is the unexpected management earnings (revenue) forecast, MEFi,t 
(MRFi,t) is the management earnings (revenue) forecast, and AEFi,t (ARFi,t) is the Value Line 
database’s most recent analyst earnings (revenue) forecast before the management earnings 
(revenue) forecast. Hereafter, the subscripts on the variables are not included except when the 
variables appear in equations. Analysts’ forecasts are collected from the Value Line Estimates & 
                                                          
8 However, we do not apply the two-index pricing model for the analyses that include rivals with different industry 
membership because it is not sensible to control for industry returns in this sample. When rivals do not have the 
same four-digit SIC codes as the forecasters, the control for common industry return shocks implicit in the two-
index model fails to remove the common elements for these rivals. 
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Projections File because it is the only database that systematically includes both earnings and 
revenue forecasts. Data in this database correspond to the estimates in the most recently 
published paper copy of the Value Line Investment Survey.  Unlike the Institutional Brokers 
Estimate System (IBES) database, no subsequent adjustments for stock splits and stock dividends 
are made to the data in the Value Line database.  
Management forecasts appear in different forms. In order to fully utilize the sample 
forecasts, we use all available quantitative management forecasts. In measuring the forecast 
errors in equations (3) and (4), the management point estimate of earnings (revenue) is used to 
proxy for MEF (MRF) when management issues a point forecast. When management issues a 
range forecast, the midpoint of the range is used and when management issues a minimum 
(maximum) forecast, the lower (upper) bound is used.  In addition, to make it comparable to the 
Value Line forecast, a management earnings forecast is converted to a per share amount if it is 
not in the form of earnings per share.  A management revenue forecast is converted to a total 
sales amount and compared to the Value Line forecast if it is forecasted on a per share basis.  
 Two cumulative abnormal returns are calculated for forecasting and non-forecasting 
firms. The first utilizes abnormal returns from the single-index model in equation (1). The 
second is cumulative abnormal returns based on the two-index model in equation (2). The 
following is our measure:   
 ∑+=
=
=
1t
-2t
t i,t i,   CAR ξ    (5) 
where the event period is day -2 to day +1 relative to the forecast day and ξ is either u or e from 
model (1) or (2). Also, for the remainder of this paper, CAR based on the single-index model will 
be denoted by MCAR and CAR based on the two-index model will be denoted by IMCAR. 
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4. Empirical Results 
4.1. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 Table 1 shows descriptive statistics. FCMCAR ( NFMCAR ) is CAR for forecasting (non-
forecasting) firms, where CAR is computed for days {-2, +1} using the single-index pricing 
model. FCIMCAR ( NFIMCAR ) is CAR for forecasting (non-forecasting) firms, where CAR is 
computed for days {-2, +1} using the two-index pricing model.  
 Panel A presents descriptive statistics for forecasting firms. The forecasting firm full 
sample median value of FCMCAR  ( FCIMCAR ) is -0.32% (-0.29%), indicating that the sample 
forecasts are on average bad news. This is supported by a full sample median value for UMEF of 
-2.81% and a full sample median value for UMRF of -0.37%. Another interesting finding is that 
the median UMEF value is -5.74% when earnings forecasts are issued alone but -2.50% when 
earnings and revenue forecasts are issued together. This implies the possibility that when the 
management earnings forecast surprise is better, management is more likely to include 
supporting information in the form of a revenue forecast to enhance the believability of the 
management earnings forecast (Dye, 1986; Jennings, 1987; Hutton, Miller, and Skinner, 2003). 
Also, as expected, average UMEF and UMRF are higher for firms with positive CAR (good news) 
than for firms with negative CAR (bad news). Panel B of Table 1 shows the summary statistics 
for non-forecasting firms that share the same four-digit primary SIC code industry with 
forecasting firms. MCARNF and IMCARNF are slightly higher when forecasting firms have 
positive CAR than when forecasting firms have negative CAR.   
 Overall, the magnitudes of non-forecasting firms’ returns are much smaller than those of 
forecasting firms. For example, when the forecasting firms release good news (i.e., positive 
FCMCAR ), the median value of non-forecasting firms’ abnormal returns is -0.13% while the 
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corresponding median value for forecasting firms is 2.88%. Similarly, when the forecasting firms 
issue bad news (i.e., negative FCMCAR ), the median value of non-forecasting firms’ abnormal 
returns is -0.32% while the corresponding median value for forecasting firms is –5.84%.   
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
4.2.     RANK CORRELATION ANALYSES 
 Table 2 presents Spearman correlations among selected variables for firms that issue 
earnings and revenue forecasts together and their non-forecasting industry counterparts. Overall, 
the results under the single-index pricing model are similar to those under the two-index pricing 
model.  Panel A shows the correlations for the entire sample of non-forecasting firms with the 
same four-digit primary SIC code. As expected, there are strong positive correlations between 
MCARFC (IMCARFC) and both UMEF and UMRF. Also, the correlation between MCARNF 
(IMCARNF) and MCARFC (IMCARFC) is positive and significant at the one percent level. The 
relation between UMEF and MCARNF (IMCARNF) is positive and significant (insignificant).9  In 
sum, the full sample results give some indication of positive intra-industry information transfer.      
 Panel B reports correlations between variables for forecasting firms and non-forecasting 
firms that are identified as rivals through the Hoover’s and 10-K search and share the same four-
digit primary SIC codes as the forecasters. The results reveal a positive association between 
MCARFC and MCARNF that is significant at the five percent level. However, the correlation 
between IMCARFC and IMCARNF is statistically insignificant. Interestingly, the correlations 
                                                          
9 The correlation between MCARFC (IMCARFC) and MCARNF (IMCARNF) is calculated based on non-forecaster 
observations by matching  MCARFC (IMCARFC) of a forecaster with MCARNF (IMCARNF) of each non-forecaster in 
the same four-digit SIC code. Other correlations are calculated based on forecaster observations. We also calculate 
the correlation between MCARFC (IMCARFC) and MCARNF (IMCARNF) based on forecaster observations by matching 
median MCARNF (IMCARNF) of non-forecasters with forecaster MCARFC (IMCARFC) and obtain similar results 
(untabulated). 
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between UMRF and both MCARNF and IMCARNF are negative. Therefore, the results suggest that 
negative intra-industry information transfers to rival firms may stem from competitive shifts 
conveyed by management revenue forecasts. 
 Panel C presents correlations among variables for forecasting firms and non-rival non-
forecasting firms. There is a strong positive association between UMEF (UMRF) and both 
MCARNF and IMCARNF. Also, the relation between MCARFC (IMCARFC) and MCARNF 
(IMCARNF) is positive and significant at one percent level. Overall, the results in Panel C show a 
positive intra-industry information transfer (industry commonalities) to non-forecasting industry 
counterpart firms that are not rivals of the forecasting firm.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
4.3 INFORMATION TRANSFERS FROM EARNINGS FORECASTS   
To gain initial insights on the intra-industry information transfers from management 
forecasts, we first consider only management earnings forecasts and run the following regression 
using the full sample of non-forecasting firms in the same four-digit SIC code industry:   
 titi
NF
ti
NF
ti UMEFIMCARorMCAR ,,10,,   ) ( εαα ++=  (6) 
where NFMCAR ( )NFIMCAR  is CAR for non-forecasting firms when CAR is computed for days 
{-2, +1} using the single-index (two-index) pricing model and UMEF is the unexpected 
management earnings forecast. Regression model (6) serves as the baseline model. To capture 
the effect of the information transfer from a forecasting firm to its rival firms and non-rival firms 
separately, we run the following regression with rival dummies: 
 t,iRIVALt,it,iRIVAL
NF
t,i
NF
t,i D*UMEFUMEFD)IMCAR or(MCAR εαααα ++++= 3210   (7) 
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where RIVALD  is an indicator variable that takes on a value of one if the non-forecaster is a 
competitor identified through Hoover’s and 10-Ks, and zero otherwise.  
 We run three versions of regression equation (7). To examine the intra-industry 
information transfers to rival firms and non-rival firms separately, we estimate the regression 
models with only non-forecasting firms that share the same four-digit primary SIC codes. Next, 
to provide more general evidence of negative information transfers to rival firms, we run two 
versions of the regression with more observations. Specifically, we run the regression including 
rival firms that share the same two-digit primary SIC codes with the forecasters to see if negative 
information transfers can be extended to rival firms outside of the four-digit SIC industry.  We 
also run the regression including all rival firms identified through Hoover’s and 10-Ks regardless 
of industry membership.   
 The results are reported in Table 3.  In Panel A, the results from regression equation (6) 
using the single-index and the two-index models confirm the findings of Han, Wild, and Ramesh 
(1989).  The coefficient on UMEF from the single index model is positive and significant at the 
five percent level (t-value = 2.19), while the coefficient from the two-index model is statistically 
insignificant. Thus, when returns are adjusted for industry index movements as well as market 
movements, positive intra-industry information transfer disappears. We argue that positive and  
negative intra-industry information transfers may offset each other and lead to an overall finding 
of no information transfer.  The results from regression equation (7) provide evidence that is 
consistent with our conjecture.  
  In Panel B of Table 3, the first regression is estimated with only non-forecasting firms 
that share the same four-digit primary SIC code with forecasters. The coefficient 2α  is for non-
rival firms and the coefficient on the interaction, 3α , captures the difference in information 
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transfer to rival and non-rival firms.  Therefore, 32 αα +  is the coefficient for rival firms. We 
also run the regression models with the same set of non-forecasting firms using the two-index 
pricing model and the results are reported in Panel C. The coefficients on UMEF for non-rival 
firms are positive and statistically significant from the single-index model (t-value = 2.32 in 
Panel B) and the two-index model (t-value = 2.37 in Panel C). However, this is not case for the 
rival firms. The coefficients on UMEF*DRIVAL are negative for both the single-index and the two-
index models, though the coefficient is statistically significant only for the two-index model (t-
value = -2.95). Also, the coefficient on UMEF for rival firms, 32 αα + , is negative and 
statistically significant for the two-index model (t-value = -2.28). These results indicate that 
when an earnings forecast is released, an unexpected management earnings forecast leads to a 
negative intra-industry information transfer to rival firms but a positive intra-industry 
information transfer to non-rival firms.  
 The stronger negative information transfer in the two-index model can help explain the 
findings in Han, Wild, and Ramesh (1989). They find a positive intra-industry information 
transfer from management earnings forecasts in the single-index model, which disappears in the 
two-index model.  A prevalent negative information transfer to rival firms captured in the two-
index model may have caused an overall finding of no information transfers in Panel A, as in 
Han, Wild, and Ramesh (1989).10 
                                                          
10 We employ the two-index model to control for general industry index movements. Abnormal returns from the 
two-index model separate announcement-induced information transfers from not only market-wide shocks, but also 
common industry shocks. Negative intra-industry information transfer should be more pronounced in the two-index 
model because industry-wide shocks may neutralize the effect of negative information transfer when the single-
index model is used. The evidence reported in Tables 3 to 5 is generally consistent with this prediction. For this 
reason, when the results from the single-index and two-index models do not agree, we should emphasize the results 
from the two-index model. 
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 Some of the forecasters’ rivals identified from Hoover’s and 10-K reports do not share 
the same four-digit primary SIC codes with forecasters. Although examining rival firms in the 
same four-digit SIC industry provides insights on intra-industry information transfers and 
enables us to reconcile our results with those in the prior literature, investigation of information 
transfers to rivals regardless of whether they are in the same four-digit SIC industry could 
provide more general evidence of negative information transfers to rival firms. Therefore, we run 
regression equation (7) with additional rivals outside of the forecaster’s four-digit SIC industry. 
However, for samples that include rivals that do not share the same four-digit industry 
membership with the forecaster, we do not apply the two-index pricing model because it is not 
sensible to control for industry returns in those samples. When rivals do not share the same four-
digit SIC industry code, the control for the forecaster’s industry cross-sectional covariation 
through the two-index model does not remove the industry-wide shock for these rivals.  Panel B 
of Table 3 reports the results. We estimate the second regression including rivals that share the 
same two-digit SIC code and the third regression with all rivals regardless of industry 
membership. The results are qualitatively similar to those that utilize rivals with the same four-
digit SIC code. In both regressions, the coefficient on UMEF for non-rival firms, 2α , is positive 
and statistically significant.  However, the coefficient for rival firms, 32 αα + , is negative but 
insignificant when rival firms share the same two-digit or four-digit SIC code. The coefficient 
3α  is negative and marginally significant in the second regression. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
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4.4 INFORMATION TRANSFERS FROM EARNINGS AND REVENUE FORECASTS 
 If negative information transfers mean competitive shifts between rival firms, 
information about revenue as well as earnings would be valuable to investors of rival firms. 
Therefore, to delve into this, we focus on the sample of management forecasts with both earnings 
and revenue and attempt to separate out positive and negative information transfers. 
 We first confirm the results reported in Table 3 using the forecasting firms that issue both 
earnings and revenue forecasts and matched non-forecasting firms. Table 4 reports the results. 
Overall, the results are quite similar to those reported in Table 3.  As shown in Table 4, Panel A, 
the baseline regression results using the single-index and two-index models show that the 
explanatory powers of the regression models are greater for firms issuing both earnings and 
revenue forecasts together than those reported in Panel A of Table 3.  In the two-index model, 
the coefficient on UMEF is marginally significant for forecasting firms issuing both earnings and 
revenues together, which is different from insignificant coefficients reported in Panel A of Table 
3 and in Han, Wild, and Ramesh (1989).  In panels B and C, information transfers to non-rival 
firms ( 2α ) are positive and significant in all regressions. Information transfers to rival firms 
( 32 αα + ) are mostly negative although they are only marginally significant for rivals with the 
same four-digit SIC code as the forecaster.  The coefficient that shows the difference between 
rival and non-rival firms ( 3α ) is negative and significant at conventional levels. The latter result 
is more evident than that reported in Table 3. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 Next, using the sample of non-forecasting firms in the same four-digit SIC code industry 
as firms that issue both earnings and revenue forecasts, we estimate the following base model 
with both unexpected management earnings and revenue forecasts:    
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 t,it,it,i
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t,i UMRFUMEF)IMCAR or(MCAR εααα +++= 210    (8) 
where UMRF is the unexpected management revenue forecast.   
 To capture the effects of information transfers to rival firms and non-rival firms 
separately, we also run the following regression: 
 RIVALtiRIVAL
NF
ti
NF
ti DUMEFUMEFDIMCARorMCAR *) ( 3,210,, αααα +++=
tiRIVALti DUMRFUMRF ,5,4 * εαα +++     (9) 
where RIVALD  is an indicator variable that takes on a value of one if the non-forecaster is a rival 
firm, and zero otherwise.  We further refine the sample based on the types of forecast news: good 
and bad news forecasts. 
 Table 5 presents the results. In Panel A, we report the results from baseline equation (8) 
and find no evidence of intra-industry information transfers from UMEF or UMRF using both 
the single-index and two-index models. This could be due to the offsetting effects of positive 
information transfers to one group of non-forecasting firms and negative information transfers to 
another group of non-forecasting firms.    
 Thus, to further investigate this issue, we run three versions of regression equation (9): 
(1) the first model including non-rival firms and rival firms identified through Hoover’s and 10-
Ks that share the same four-digit primary SIC codes; (2) the second model including non-rival 
firms and rival firms that share the same two-digit primary SIC codes with the forecasters; and 
(3) the third model including non-rival firms and all rival firms identified through Hoover’s and 
10-Ks regardless of industry membership.  Again, we estimate the first model to investigate 
different intra-industry information transfers, and the second and third models to find more 
general evidence of negative information transfer to rival firms. 
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 Panel B of Table 5 reports the results from the single-index model with non-forecasting 
firms that share the same four-digit primary SIC code with forecasters. In the first regression 
using the full sample, the coefficient on UMEF, 2α , is positive and significant and the 
coefficient on UMRF, 4α , is positive but insignificant. In contrast, for rival firms, the sum of the 
coefficients on UMEF, 32 αα + , is positive but insignificant while the sum of the coefficients on 
UMRF, 54 αα + , is negative and significant (t-value = -1.97).  These results suggest a positive 
information transfer from earnings forecasts to non-rival firms and a negative information 
transfer from revenue forecasts to rival firms. It is also interesting to note that negative 
information transfers from earnings forecasts that are reported in Table 4 (i.e., results before 
controlling for revenue forecast information) disappear when revenue forecast information is 
included in the regressions.  
 We further refine the analyses by partitioning the sample based on the types of 
management forecast news. As shown in the second regression in Panel B, for cases in which the 
news in the revenue and earnings forecasts are on average good (i.e., positive forecasting firm’s 
CAR), the coefficient on UMEF is positive and significant for non-rival firms, but the coefficient 
on UMRF is insignificant. For rival firms, the sum of the coefficients on both UMEF, 32 αα + , 
and UMRF, 54 αα + , are insignificant. For bad news forecasts (i.e., negative forecasting firm’s 
CAR), the coefficient sum on UMEF, 32 αα + , is positive and significant (t-value = 2.01) but the 
coefficient sum on UMRF, 54 αα + , is negative and significant (t-value = -2.01).  These results 
indicate that for cases in which the news in the revenue and earnings forecasts are on average 
bad, negative intra-industry information transfer to rival firms is delivered through revenue 
information.   
 20
 Panels C and D of Table 5 show the results of regression equation (9) including rivals 
outside of the forecaster’s four-digit SIC industry.  This analysis provides more general evidence 
of negative information transfers from revenue forecasts. Again, within this framework, it is not 
sensible to apply the two-index pricing model. The results are qualitatively similar to those 
reported in Panel B.  Overall, the findings in Panels C and D confirm the previous findings of 
negative information transfers to rival firms from management revenue forecasts, where the 
negative information transfers are more prevalent in the bad news forecasts.  Thus, the evidence 
of negative information transfer to rival firms can be generalized beyond the forecaster’s four-
digit SIC industry.   
 Finally, we run regression equation (9) using the two-index pricing model with rival and 
non-rival firms that share the same four-digit primary SIC code.  Panel E of Table 5 reports the 
results. The results are similar to those presented in Panel B.  However, the negative information 
transfer from revenue forecasts to rival firms is marginally significant for both good and bad 
news forecasts.  
 In sum, we find positive intra-industry information transfers, which indicate industry 
commonalities, to non-rivals in the same industry. However, when the non-forecasters are rivals, 
we find a combination of positive and negative intra-industry information transfers from 
management forecasts; more prevalent negative information transfers from revenue forecasts and 
weaker positive information transfers conveyed by earnings forecasts. Such negative information 
transfer from “revenue” forecasts rather than from “earnings” forecasts is in line with the 
common belief that market share change is more likely to be reflected in revenue forecasts than 
in earnings forecasts.  On the other hand, we find that a positive (negative) information transfer 
from earnings (revenue) forecasts is more evident in the rival firm sample when a forecasting 
firm issues bad news. We interpret these results to mean that when a firm releases both earnings 
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and revenue forecasts, and the news are on average bad, earnings forecasts are associated with 
industry commonalities and revenue forecasts are associated with a competitive shift in the 
information transfer to rival firms.11   
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
  
4.5.      ANALYSES WITH ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PROVIDED IN THE 
MANAGEMENT FORECASTS 
 
 To check the robustness of the results reported in the earlier sections, we have read 
management forecast announcements shown in the Wall Street Journal articles to check if the 
announcements include any information that helps investors form expectations about changes in 
competitive positions in an industry.  For example, when Dell Computer made a bleak 
management forecast in the July 15, 1993 edition of the Wall Street Journal, the following was 
written elsewhere in the article: 
“The company, for instance, says it is continuing to pay for a serious stumble in notebook 
computers that has kept Dell out of the fastest-growing segment of the computer business.  
Chairman Michael S. Dell said his company doesn’t expect to have a competitive notebook 
computer on the market until the end of the year.”  (Wall Street Journal, July 15, 1993) 
 
The aforementioned statement implies that Dell’s poor management forecast is at least in part 
due to its poor competitive position, which may mean good news to its rivals.   
 An indicator variable is created and set to one if a management forecast announcement 
includes any information that helps investors form expectations about changes in competitive 
position in the industry and zero otherwise. This additional information dummy variable is 
                                                          
11 We also conduct a test with firms that release earnings forecasts only and find that when the earnings forecast is 
bad news, information transfer to rival firms is negative and statistically insignificant in the single index model but 
negative and marginally significant in the two index model. This evidence is generally consistent with the results 
reported in Table 3. 
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interacted with both UMEF*DRIVAL and UMRF*DRIVAL in regression equation (9). We expect that 
negative information transfers to rival firms are stronger when additional information about 
industry competition is provided with the management forecasts. The untabulated results are 
consistent with this conjecture and are qualitatively similar regardless of the choice of pricing 
model.   
  
5. Conclusions  
         In this paper, we examine the two different types of information transfers: positive 
information transfers stemming from industry commonalities and negative information transfers 
due to competitive shifts.  Also, we study information transfers from management revenue 
forecasts as well as management earnings forecasts. Though prior literature (e.g., Foster, 1981; 
Baginski, 1987; Pownall and Waymire, 1989; Dietrich, 1989; Schipper, 1990) recognizes 
potential negative information transfers from competitive shifts, little research has focused on 
negative information transfers or separately investigated positive and negative information 
transfers.  In this study, we attempt to distinguish between positive (due to industry 
commonalities) and negative (due to the competitive shifts) information transfers associated with 
management forecasts. Using the forecasting firm’s rivals identified by Hoover’s and 10-K 
reports, we document negative (positive) information transfers to rival (non-rival) firms. The 
results of this study help one understand how information transfers operate.   
 Through the analysis of intra-industry information transfers, we show positive intra-
industry information transfers to non-rival firms and negative intra-industry information transfers 
to rivals. We also present evidence that is consistent with positive and negative intra-industry 
information transfers offsetting each other, and thereby leading to an overall finding of no 
information transfers even though they exist.  
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 Our evidence from earnings forecasts shows that the effects of negative intra-industry 
information transfers from earnings forecasts are more pronounced when industry returns are 
controlled using the two-index model. Further, negative information transfers to rival firms are 
more evident when forecasting firms predict revenues and earnings together than when they 
predict earnings alone.  
 Examination of both revenue forecasts and earnings forecasts and partitioning 
management forecasts based on good and bad news forecasts reveal additional insights on 
information transfers. When firms forecast both earnings and revenues, and the overall 
information is viewed as good news for the forecasting firms, we find that negative intra-industry 
information transfers are marginal. In contrast, when firms forecast bad news, we find a 
combination of positive and negative intra-industry information transfers to rival firms with the 
same four-digit primary SIC code; positive information transfers (industry commonalities) 
appearing in earnings forecasts and negative transfers (competitive shifts) carried by revenue 
forecasts.     
 Through an analysis using all rivals identified by Hoover’s and 10-K reports, regardless 
of their industry membership, we present more general evidence of negative information 
transfers to rival firms. We also provide evidence that negative information transfers are 
conveyed by revenue forecasts in the case of bad news forecasts, which is consistent with the 
results for rival firms in the intra-industry analysis.    
  According to the principles of modern portfolio theory, optimal investment decisions take 
into account the effect of buying or selling a firm on portfolio risk, and individual firms matter 
insofar as their characteristics combine to determine portfolio characteristics. Therefore, it is 
important for investors to estimate and evaluate the covariance of returns in a portfolio. By 
documenting different directions of return interdependencies among different firms, created from 
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management forecasts, this study sheds light on this issue. Externalities created by this voluntary 
disclosure should also be of interest to policymakers.  
 Our results should be interpreted with caution because of the low adjusted R2.  As seen 
from our results, information transfers account for less than two percent of the three-day 
abnormal returns of non-forecasters. Although the effects uncovered in our study are statistically 
significant and interesting, their economic importance might be relatively small. Therefore, 
investors may not be able to earn large profits by exploiting a rival's forecast information. 
 Future research could examine negative information transfers for required disclosures 
such as earnings and sales announcements.  In addition, since management and analyst cash flow 
forecasts have become more prevalent, it would be interesting to investigate the information 
transfers from such forecasts.
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 TABLE 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
  
Panel A: Forecasting firms  
    
   Mean  Median Std. Deviation Maximum Minimum 
        
  Full Sample -0.0204 -0.0032 0.0807 0.2056 -0.3216 
  Forecasting firms with positive CAR  0.0392  0.0288 0.0398 0.2056  0.0007 
  Forecasting firms with negative CAR -0.0724 -0.0584 0.0707 -0.0005 -0.3216 
  Earnings forecast only -0.0323 -0.0092 0.0795 0.1816 -0.3216 
  Earnings and revenue forecasts -0.0051 0.0050 0.0800 0.2056 -0.3083 
        
        
  Full Sample -0.0205 -0.0029 0.0802 0.2077 -0.3412 
  Forecasting firms with positive CAR 0.0379  0.0280 0.0383 0.2077  0.0001 
  Forecasting firms with negative CAR -0.0731 -0.0599 0.0711 -0.0001 -0.3412 
  Earnings forecast only -0.0329 -0.0079 0.0786 0.1297 -0.3412 
  Earnings and revenue forecasts -0.0046 0.0029 0.0797 0.2077 -0.3057 
        
        
  Full Sample -0.1668 -0.0281 0.9394 3.0000 -10.0000 
  Forecasting firms with positive CAR -0.0029 0.0031 0.5350 3.0000 -1.9583 
  Forecasting firms with negative CAR -0.3096 -0.0958 1.1680 3.0000 -10.0000 
  Earnings forecast only -0.2495 -0.0574 1.1299 3.0000 -10.0000 
  Earnings and revenue forecasts -0.0597 -0.0250 0.5986 3.0000 -3.3333 
        
        
  Full Sample -0.0028 -0.0037 0.2862 2.3253 -0.6998 
  Forecasting firms with positive CAR 0.0504 0.0090 0.3553 2.3253 -0.6998 
  Forecasting firms with negative CAR -0.0563 -0.0230 0.1406 0.1366 -0.6796 
  Earnings forecast only N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
  Earnings and revenue forecasts -0.0028 -0.0037 0.2862 2.3253 -0.6998 
 
 
 
FCMCAR
FCIMCAR
UMEF
UMRF
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TABLE 1: Continued  
 
Panel B:  Non-forecasting firms in the same (four-digit SIC code) industry 
 
   Mean  Median Std. Deviation Maximum Minimum 
        
  Full Sample -0.0011 -0.0022 0.0563 0.2593 -0.2211 
  Forecasting firms with positive CAR 0.0008 -0.0013 0.0569 0.2593 -0.2122 
  Forecasting firms with negative CAR -0.0028 -0.0032 0.0557 0.2575 -0.2211 
  Earnings forecast only -0.0040 -0.0036 0.0521 0.2593 -0.2211 
  Earnings and revenue forecasts -0.0008 -0.0021 0.0612 0.2543 -0.2209 
        
        
  Full Sample -0.0015 -0.0030 0.0565 0.2643 -0.2195 
  Forecasting firms with positive CAR -0.0003 -0.0020 0.0580 0.2579 -0.2195 
  Forecasting firms with negative CAR -0.0027 -0.0045 0.0548 0.2643 -0.2188 
  Earnings forecast only -0.0029 -0.0040 0.0490 0.2591 -0.2195 
  Earnings and revenue forecasts -0.0022 -0.0043 0.0628 0.2643 -0.2160 
        
 
 
FCMCAR ( NFMCAR ) =  Cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for forecasting (non-forecasting) firms, where CAR is computed for days {-2, +1} using the single-    
index pricing model.   
FCIMCAR ( NFIMCAR ) =  Cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for forecasting (non-forecasting) firms, where CAR is computed for days {-2, +1} using the two-index 
pricing model.   
 UMEF  (UMRF )  = Unexpected management earnings (revenue) forecast, measured by ( ) t,it,it,it,i AEF - AEFMEF  UMEF =  and 
( ) ,i,ti,ti,ti,t ARF - ARFMRF  UMRF =  where )( MRFMEF  is the management earnings (revenue) forecast and )( ARFAEF  is the analyst 
earnings (revenue) forecast. 
 
NFMCAR
NFIMCAR
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TABLE 2 
Spearman Correlations 
 
 Single-index Pricing Model   Two-index Pricing Model 
          
Panel A: Full sample of non-forecasters that share the same four-digit SIC codes with forecasting firms    
           
  MCARFC MCARNF UMEF  UMRF    IMCARFC IMCARNF UMEF  UMRF  
MCARFC 1.0000     IMCARFC 1.0000    
MCARNF 0.0674*** 1.0000    IMCARNF 0.0409*** 1.0000   
UMEF  0.4283*** 0.0340*** 1.0000   UMEF  0.3625*** 0.0152 1.0000  
UMRF  0.3976*** 0.0236 0.5396*** 1.0000  UMRF  0.3674*** 0.0271 0.5396*** 1.0000 
           
           
Panel B: Rival firms identified through Hoover’s and SEC 10-Ks that share the same four-digit SIC codes with forecasting firms  
           
 MCARFC MCARNF UMEF  UMRF    IMCARFC IMCARNF UMEF  UMRF  
MCARFC 1.0000     IMCARFC 1.0000    
MCARNF 0.1139** 1.0000    IMCARNF 0.0389 1.0000   
UMEF  0.2910*** 0.0132 1.0000   UMEF  0.2786*** 0.0478 1.0000  
UMRF  0.1759** -0.1822** 0.4328***     1.0000  UMRF  0.1662* -0.1618* 0.4328***     1.0000 
           
           
Panel C: Non-rival firms     
          
 MCARFC MCARNF UMEF  UMRF    IMCARFC IMCARNF UMEF  UMRF  
MCARFC 1.0000     IMCARFC 1.0000    
MCARNF 0.0583*** 1.0000    IMCARNF 0.0873*** 1.0000   
UMEF  0.4528*** 0.0450*** 1.0000   UMEF  0.4702*** 0.0491*** 1.0000  
UMRF  0.3684*** 0.0598** 0.6031*** 1.0000  UMRF  0.4225*** 0.0817*** 0.6031*** 1.0000 
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TABLE 2: continued 
 
 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, based on two-tail tests. 
FCMCAR ( NFMCAR ) = Cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for forecasting (non-forecasting) firms, where CAR is computed for days {-2, +1} using the single-index 
pricing model.   
FCIMCAR ( NFIMCAR ) = Cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for forecasting (non-forecasting) firms, where CAR is computed for days {-2, +1} using the two-index 
pricing model.   
UMEF  (UMRF)  =  Unexpected management earnings (revenue) forecast, measured by ( ) t,it,it,it,i AEF - AEFMEF  UMEF =  and  
( ) ,ARF - ARFMRF  UMRF i,ti,ti,ti,t =  where MEF (MRF) is the management earnings (revenue) forecast and AEF (ARF) is the analyst   
                                          earnings (revenue) forecast. 
 
Rivals are defined to be all non-forecasting firms that are listed as rivals of the forecasting firm in either Hoover’s or the forecasting firm’s 10-K report. Non-rivals of the  
forecaster are those that share the same four-digit SIC code as the forecaster but are not listed as rivals in Hoover’s or the 10-K report. 
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TABLE 3 
Information Transfers from Management Earnings Forecasts:   
Non-Forecasting Firms Matched against Sample Forecasting Firms that Issue Earnings Forecasts 
             
titi
NF
ti
NF
ti UMEFIMCAR orMCAR ,,10,, )( εαα ++=  
              t,iRIVALt,it,iRIVAL
NF
t,i
NF
t,i D*UMEFUMEFD)IMCAR or(MCAR εαααα ++++= 3210  
 
 
Panel A: Intra-industry information transfer associated with unexpected management earnings forecasts – Base model 
        
   Single-index Pricing Model  Two-index Pricing Model 
 N  0α  1α     Adj 2R   0α 1α Adj 2R  
Non-forecasting firms in the same four-digit SIC industry           
 5,041  -0.0010  0.0050    0.0007  -0.0016  0.0023    -0.0000 
   (-1.31)  (2.19) **     (-2.12) ** (0.99)     
 
 
Panel B: Pooled sample including rivals identified through Hoover’s and SEC 10-Ks: Using the single-index model 
  
 N 0α   1α   2α   3α   Adj 2R   32 αα +  
1. Pooled sample including rivals identified through Hoover’s and SEC 10-Ks that share the same four-digit SIC codes with forecasting firms 
 5,041 -0.0026  -0.0004  0.0017  -0.0042    -0.0025 
  (-3.79) *** (-0.20)  (2.32) ** (-1.70)  0.0006  (-1.05) 
             
2. Pooled sample including rivals identified through Hoover’s and SEC 10-Ks that share the same two-digit SIC codes with forecasting firms 
 5,433 -0.0026  -0.0013  0.0017  -0.0034    -0.0017 
  (-3.84) *** (0.72)  (2.35) ** (-1.86) * 0.0008  (-1.01) 
             
3. Pooled sample including all rivals identified through Hoover’s and SEC 10-Ks 
 6,466 -0.0026  0.0003  0.0017  -0.0003    0.0014 
  (-3.93) *** (0.22)  (2.41) ** (-0.25)  0.0006  (1.12) 
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TABLE 3: continued 
 
Panel C: Pooled sample including rivals identified through Hoover’s and SEC 10-Ks that share the same four-digit SIC codes with forecasting        
firms: Using the two-index model  
 
 N 0α   1α   2α   3α   Adj 2R   32 αα +  
              
 5,041 -0.0016  -0.0002  0.0030  -0.0110    -0.0080  
  (-1.70) * (-0.07)  (2.37) **  (-2.95) *** 0.0014  (-2.28) ** 
 
 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, based on two-tail tests.  N is the number of non-forecasting firm observations. 
t-values are in parentheses.   
NFMCAR  ( NFIMCAR ) = Cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for non-forecasting firms, where CAR is computed for days {-2, +1} using the single-index (two-index)   
 pricing model.   
UMEF  = Unexpected management earnings forecast, measured by ( ) t,it,it,it,i AEF - AEFMEF  UMEF = , where MEF  is the management earnings forecast and AEF  is 
the analyst earnings forecast.   
DRIVAL = an indicator variable that takes on a value of 1 if the non-forecasting firm is defined as a rival identified through Hoover’s or the forecasting firm’s 10-K, 0 
otherwise.  
In Panel C, we do not apply the two-index pricing model for the analyses using rivals outside of the forecasters’ four-digit SIC industries because it is not sensible to 
control for industry returns in those samples. 
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TABLE 4 
Information Transfers from Management Earnings Forecasts:   
Non-Forecasting Firms Matched against Sample Forecasting Firms that Issue Both Earnings and Revenue Forecasts 
             
titi
NF
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              t,iRIVALt,it,iRIVAL
NF
t,i
NF
t,i D*UMEFUMEFD)IMCAR or(MCAR εαααα ++++= 3210  
 
 
Panel A: Intra-industry information transfer associated with unexpected management earnings forecasts – Base model 
        
   Single-index Pricing Model  Two-index Pricing Model 
 N  0α  1α     Adj 2R   0α 1α Adj 2R  
Non-forecasting firms in the same four-digit SIC industry           
 1,732  -0.0004  0.0037    0.0021  -0.0033  0.0048    0.0013 
   (-0.25)  (2.26) **     (-2.29) ** (1.89) *    
 
 
Panel B: Pooled sample including rivals identified through Hoover’s and SEC 10-Ks: Using the single-index model 
  
 N 0α   1α   2α   3α   Adj 2R   32 αα +  
1. Pooled sample including rivals identified through Hoover’s and SEC 10-Ks that share the same four-digit SIC codes with forecasting firms 
 1,732 -0.0032  0.0002  0.0055  -0.0097    -0.0042 
  (-2.99) *** (0.07)  (2.58) *** (-2.92) *** 0.0038  (-1.66) * 
             
2. Pooled sample including rivals identified through Hoover’s and SEC 10-Ks that share the same two-digit SIC codes with forecasting firms 
 1,884 -0.0032  0.0005  0.0055  -0.0076    -0.0021 
  (-3.01) *** (0.19)  (2.60) *** (-2.44) ** 0.0027  (-0.93) 
             
3. Pooled sample including all rivals identified through Hoover’s and SEC 10-Ks 
 2,290 -0.0032  0.0022  0.0055  -0.0048    0.0007 
  (-3.11) *** (1.24)  (2.68) *** (-1.85) * 0.0034  (0.40) 
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TABLE 4: continued 
 
Panel C: Pooled sample including rivals identified through Hoover’s and SEC 10-Ks that share the same four-digit SIC codes with forecasting     
firms: Using the two-index model  
 
 N 0α   1α   2α   3α   Adj 2R   32 αα +  
              
 1,732 -0.0051  0.0024  0.0101  -0.0169    -0.0068  
  (-3.26) *** (0.49)  (3.29) *** (-3.38) *** 0.0059  (-1.73) * 
 
 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, based on two-tail tests.  N is the number of non-forecasting firm observations. 
t-values are in parentheses.   
NFMCAR  ( NFIMCAR ) = Cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for non-forecasting firms, where CAR is computed for days {-2, +1} using the single-index (two-index)   
 pricing model.   
UMEF  = Unexpected management earnings forecast, measured by ( ) t,it,it,it,i AEF - AEFMEF  UMEF = , where MEF  is the management earnings forecast and AEF  is 
the analyst earnings forecast.   
DRIVAL = an indicator variable that takes on a value of 1 if the non-forecasting firm is defined as a rival identified through Hoover’s or the forecasting firm’s 10-K, 0 
otherwise.  
In Panel C, we do not apply the two-index pricing model for the analyses using rivals outside of the forecasters’ four-digit SIC industries because it is not sensible to 
control for industry returns in those samples. 
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TABLE 5 
Information Transfers from Management Earnings and Revenue Forecasts:   
Non-Forecasting Firms Matched against Sample Forecasting Firms that Issue both Earnings and Revenue Forecasts 
 
      t,it,it,i
NF
t,i
NF
t,i UMRFUMEF)IMCAR or(MCAR εααα +++= 210  
t,iRIVALitt,iRIVALitt,iRIVAL
NF
t,i
NF
t,i D*UMRFUMRFD*UMEFUMEFD)IMCAR or(MCAR εαααααα ++++++= 543210  
 
 
Panel A: Intra-industry information transfer associated with unexpected management earnings and revenue forecasts – Base model  
 
   Single-index Pricing Model  Two-index Pricing Model 
 N  0α  1α 2α Adj 2R   0α 1α 2α    Adj 2R  
Non-forecasting firms in the same four-digit SIC industry           
 1,732  -0.0007  0.0024  0.0023  -0.0007  -0.0012  0.0002  0.0037  -0.0008 
   (-0.49)  (0.55)  (0.32)    (-0.83)  (0.03)  (0.52)   
                  
 
 
Panel B: Pooled sample including rivals identified through Hoover’s and SEC 10-Ks that share the same four-digit SIC codes with forecasting     
firms: Using the single-index pricing model  
 
 N 0α   1α   2α   3α   4α   5α   Adj 2R   32 αα +   54 αα +   
1. Full sample          
 1,732 0.0032  -0.0153  0.0050  -0.0011  0.0041  -0.0854    0.0039  -0.0813  
  (2.55) ** (-3.88) *** (3.31) *** (-0.34)  (0.62)  (-2.04) ** 0.0116  (1.33)  (-1.97) ** 
                    
2. Sub-sample with positive forecasting firm CAR          
 899 0.0047  -0.0087  0.0147  -0.0133  -0.0054  -0.0455    0.0014  -0.0509  
  (2.92) *** (-1.62)  * (2.88) *** (-0.80)   (-0.80)  (-0.98)   0.0066  (0.10)  (-1.11)  
                    
3. Sub-sample with negative forecasting firm CAR          
 833 0.0008  -0.0254  0.0033  0.0034  0.0049  -0.2116    0.0067  -0.2067  
  (0.37) *** (-4.00) *** (1.98) ** (0.91)  (0.45)  (-2.04) ** 0.0169  (2.01) ** (-2.01) ** 
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TABLE 5: continued 
  
Panel C: Pooled sample including rivals identified through Hoover’s and SEC 10-Ks that share the same two-digit SIC codes with forecasting 
firms: Using the single-index pricing model  
 
 N 0α   1α   2α   3α   4α   5α   Adj 2R   32 αα +   54 αα +   
1. Full sample          
 1,884 0.0032  -0.0145  0.0050  -0.0013  0.0041  -0.0956    0.0037  -0.0915  
  (2.60) *** (-4.85) *** (3.38) ** (-0.44)  (0.63)  (-2.63) *** 0.0151  (1.47)  (-2.56) ** 
                    
2. Sub-sample with positive forecasting firm CAR          
 994 0.0047  -0.0100  0.0147  -0.0117  -0.0054  -0.0644    0.0030  -0.0698  
  (3.02) *** (-2.56) *** (2.99) *** (-0.90)   (-0.62)  (-1.53)  0.0110  (0.24)  (-1.70) * 
                    
3. Sub-sample with negative forecasting firm CAR          
 890 0.0008  -0.0218  0.0033  0.0019  0.0049  -0.1685    0.0052  -0.1636  
  (0.37)  (-4.32) *** (1.99) ** (0.57)  (0.45)  (-2.22) ** 0.0188  (1.82) * (-2.17) ** 
 
 
Panel D: Pooled sample including all rivals identified through Hoover’s and SEC 10-Ks: Using the single-index pricing model  
 
 N 0α   1α   2α   3α   4α   5α   Adj 2R   32 αα +   54 αα +   
1. Full sample  
 2,290 0.0032  -0.0054  0.0050  -0.0023  0.0041  -0.0620    0.0027  -0.0579  
  (2.65) *** (-2.53) ** (3.45) *** (-1.01)  (0.65)  (-2.54) ** 0.0071  (1.45)  (-2.45) ** 
                    
2. Sub-sample with positive forecasting firm CAR          
 1,166 0.0047  0.0016  0.0147  -0.0019  -0.0054  -0.0284    0.0128  -0.0338  
  (3.02) *** (0.55)  (2.98) *** (-0.18)   (-0.62)  (-0.88)   0.0052  (1.38)  (-1.08)  
                    
3. Sub-sample with negative forecasting firm CAR          
 1,124 0.0008  -0.0114  0.0033  0.0006  0.0049  -0.1254    0.0039  -0.1205  
  (0.39) *** (-3.49) *** (2.10) **  (0.26)   (0.48)  (-3.15) *** 0.0140  (2.08) ** (-3.13) *** 
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TABLE 5: continued 
           
Panel E: Pooled sample including rivals identified through Hoover’s and SEC 10-Ks that share the same four-digit SIC codes with forecasting     
firms: Using the two-index pricing model  
   
 N 0α   1α   2α   3α   4α   5α   Adj 2R   32 αα +       54 αα +   
1. Full sample          
 1,732 0.0018  -0.0058  0.0081  -0.0015  0.0111  -0.1192    0.0066  -0.1080  
  (1.41)  (-1.40)   (2.48) **  (-0.16)   (1.64)  (-2.32) ** 0.0074  (0.73)  (-2.12) ** 
                    
2. Sub-sample with positive forecasting firm CAR          
 899 0.0066  -0.0080  0.0106  0.0145  -0.0062  -0.1078    0.0251  -0.1139  
  (3.95) ***  (1.31)  (1.98) **  (0.80)   (-0.65)  (-1.68) * 0.0035  (1.44)  (-1.79) * 
                    
3. Sub-sample with negative forecasting firm CAR          
 833 -0.0066  0.0089  -0.0028  0.0077  0.0193  -0.1886    0.0049  -0.1693  
  (-3.18) ***  (1.52)   (-0.69)   (0.72)   (1.94) * (-2.09) ** 0.0033  (0.49)  (-1.89) * 
 
 
 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, based on two-tail tests.  N is the number of non-forecasting firm observations. 
t-values are in parentheses.   
NFMCAR  ( NFIMCAR ) = Cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for non-forecasting firms, where CAR is computed for days {-2, +1} using the single-index (two-index)   
 pricing model.     
UMEF (UMRF) = Unexpected management earnings (revenue) forecast, measured by ( ) t,it,it,it,i AEF - AEFMEF  UMEF =  and ( ) ,i,ti,ti,ti,t ARF - ARFMRF  UMRF =  
where MEF (MRF) is the management earnings (revenue) forecast and AEF (ARF) is the analyst earnings (revenue) forecast.   
DRIVAL =  an indicator variable that takes on a value of 1 if the non-forecasting firm is defined as a rival identified through Hoover’s or the forecasting firm’s 10-K, 0 
otherwise.   
Sample observations are classified into two categories based on the sign of forecasting firms’ CARs, where CAR is cumulative abnormal returns computed for days  
{-2, +1}.  We do not apply the two-index pricing model for the analyses using rivals outside of the forecasters’ four-digit SIC industries because it is not sensible to 
control for industry returns in those samples. 
 
